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Abstract
This paper investigates the nature of U.S. ﬁscal policy in the aftermath
of 9/11. We argue that the recent dramatic fall in the government surplus
and the large fall in tax rates cannot be accounted for by either the state of
the U.S. economy as of 9/11 or as the typical response of ﬁscal policy to a
large exogenous rise in military expenditures. Our evidence suggests that,
had tax rates responded in the way they ‘normally’ do to large exogenous
changes in government spending, aggregate output would have been lower
and the surplus would not have changed by much. The unusually large fall
in tax rates had an expansionary impact on output and was the primary
force underlying the large decline in the surplus. Our results do not bear
directly on the question of whether the decline in tax rates and the decline
in the surplus after 9/11 were desirable or not.
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This paper investigates the nature of U.S. ﬁscal policy in the aftermath of 9/11.
We focus on the question: Is ﬁscal policy in the aftermath of 9/11 well explained as
the normal response of the U.S. economy to a large exogenous increase in military
expenditures? In our view, the answer is no. The recent dramatic fall in the
government surplus (i.e. the rise in the deﬁcit) and the large fall in labor and
capital tax rates cannot be accounted for by either the state of the U.S. economy
as of 9/11 or as the typical response of ﬁscal policy to a large exogenous rise
in military expenditures. The explanation must be sought elsewhere. The most
obvious candidates are recent changes in the U.S. tax code and the slowdown in
economic activity around the onset of the Iraq war. Our results indicate that
changes in the tax code played the primary role. Speciﬁcally, we argue that had
tax rates responded in the way they ‘normally’ do to large exogenous changes in
government spending, the government surplus would not have changed by much
and might have actually risen.
To establish the ‘normal’ response of ﬁscal policy to large shocks, we build
on the approach used by Ramey and Shapiro (1998). These authors identify
three political events, arguably unrelated to developments in the domestic U.S.
economy, that led to large, exogenous increases in military expenditures. These
events, which we refer to as Ramey - Shapiro episodes, coincide roughly with the
onset of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Carter - Reagan defense
buildup. We identify the normal response of ﬁscal policy to a large military shock
with our estimate of the dynamic response paths of government purchases, the
government surplus and capital and labor tax rates to a Ramey - Shapiro episode.
To assess whether ﬁscal policy was unusual after 9/11, we use our estimated
statistical model to generate forecasts of tax rates, output, government consump-
1tion, the real interest rate and the surplus conditional on (i) the occurrence of
a ﬁscal shock in 2001:3, (ii) the state of the economy as of 2001:2 and (iii) the
assumption that ﬁscal policy responds to 9/11 i nt h es a m ew a yt h a ti td i di n
the three Ramey - Shapiro episodes. We ﬁnd that the general rise in government
consumption is well explained by the 9/11 shock. So too is the rise in output, al-
though there is clear evidence of another shock which drove output down in 2002.
However, the responses of the surplus to GDP ratio and tax rates are substan-
tially less well explained by the 9/11 shock. For example, the declines in average
capital and labor tax rates are much larger than our conditional forecast. Perhaps
even more striking is the diﬀerence between the actual and predicted values of the
surplus to GDP ratio. Our statistical model predicts that, had the government
responded to 9/11 as it typically did in the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, then absent
other shocks, the surplus would initially have risen and then slowly declined to the
point where the consolidated budget was balanced. In reality, the surplus suﬀered
a sharp, ongoing decline. Taken together, these results suggest that ﬁscal policy
in the aftermath of 9/11 is not well explained as the normal response of policy to
a large exogenous increase in military spending.
This leaves open the question: How would aggregate output and the surplus
to GDP ratio have responded to the post-9/11 rise in government consumption
had the government pursued alternative tax policies? We cannot use our statis-
tical model to address the impact of systematic changes in policy. A structural
model is required. The particular model t h a tw eu s ei st h eo n ed e v e l o p e di nB u r n -
side, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004). We use this model because it does well at
accounting quantitatively for the consequences of the Ramey - Shapiro episodes.
We consider three possible tax responses to 9/11.I n t h e ﬁrst, we assume
that tax rates responded the way they normally do after a Ramey - Shapiro
episode. In the second, we assume that tax rates do not change from their pre-
29/11 levels. In the third, we assume that average labor and capital taxes fall by
four percentage points in a very persistent way. This fall roughly corresponds
to the actual decline in average taxes between 2001:2 and 2003:3. In all cases,
we assume that government consumption rises in a way commensurate with what
actually occurred after 9/11.
Our ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. With the ﬁrst and second spec-
iﬁcations, 9/11 would have been associated with a small initial rise, followed by
a persistent but small decline, in the surplus to GDP ratio. In contrast and
consistent with the actual post-9/11 data, the third speciﬁcation implies that the
surplus to GDP ratio would have declined immediately and then stayed well below
its pre-shock level for an extended period of time. To the extent that the Bush tax
cuts are viewed as highly persistent, this result provides a formal interpretation
of the view that the large drop in the surplus to GDP ratio following 9/11 is due
to an atypical reduction in tax rates after a large increase in military spending.
Our structural model also implies that a cut in tax rates leads to a subtantial
rise in output, with the precise magnitude depending on the elasticity of labor
supply. Evaluating the welfare tradeoﬀ between the rise in output and the fall in
the surplus to GDP ratio associated with the cut in tax rates is beyond the scope
of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our
strategy for estimating the eﬀects of a Ramey - Shapiro episode and presents our
results. In that section we also use our statistical model to assess how unusual
ﬁscal policy was in the aftermath of 9/11. In section three we discuss our eco-
nomic model and use it to assess how the surplus and aggregate output would
have behaved under alternative tax responses to 9/11. Finally, section 4 contains
concluding remarks.
32. Evidence on the Eﬀects of a Shock to Fiscal Policy
In this section we describe our strategy for estimating the eﬀects of an exogenous
shock to ﬁscal policy and present our results. This strategy is very close to the
one used in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004).
2.1. Identifying the Eﬀects of a Fiscal Policy Shock
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) pursue a ‘narrative approach’ to isolate three arguably
exogenous events that led to large military buildups and increases in government
purchases: the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Carter-Reagan defense
buildup following the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Based on
their reading of history, they date these events at 1950:3, 1965:1 and 1980:1. The
weakness of this approach is that we only have three episodes of exogenous ﬁscal
policy shocks to work with. In our view, this weakness is more than oﬀset by the
compelling nature of Ramey and Shapiro’s assumption that the war episodes are
exogenous. Certainly their assumption seems plausible relative to the assumptions
typically imposed to isolate the exogenous component of statistical innovations in
government purchases and tax rates. See Blanchard and Perotti (1998), Ramey
and Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) for discussions
of alternative approaches.
To estimate the impact of exogenous movements in government purchases,
Gt, capital and labor income tax rates, τkt and τnt, on the economy, we use the
following procedure. Suppose that Gt, τkt and τnt are elements of the vector
stochastic process Zt. Deﬁne the three dummy variables Dit, i =1 ,2,3,w h e r e
Dit =
½
1, if t = di
0, otherwise





4We assume that Zt evolves according to:
Zt = A0 + A1t + A2(t ≥ 1973 : 2) + A3(L)Zt−1 +
3 X
i=1
A4(L)ψiDit + ut, (2.1)





0, for all s 6=0
Σ, for s =0 ,
Σ is a positive deﬁnite matrix of dimension equal to the number of elements in
Zt, t denotes time, and Aj(L), j =3 ,4 are ﬁnite ordered vector polynomials
in nonnegative powers of the lag operator L. As in Ramey and Shapiro (1998)
we allow for a trend break in 1973:2.1 A consistent estimate of the response
of Zit+k,t h eith element of Z at time t + k,t ot h eo n s e to ft h eith Ramey-
Shapiro episode is given by an estimate of the coeﬃcient on Lk in the expansion
of ψi [I − A3(L)L]
−1 A4(L).
The ψi in (2.1) are scalars with ψ1 normalized to unity. The parameters ψ2 and
ψ3 measure the intensity of the second and third Ramey-Shapiro episodes relative
to the ﬁrst. Based on the observed changes in government purchases, we set ψ2
and ψ3 to 0.30 and 0.10, respectively. These weights were obtained by comparing
the percentage peak rise after the onset of the Vietnam and the Carter-Reagan
defense buildup episodes to the analog rise after the Korea episode. Relation (2.1)
implies that while the ﬁscal episodes may diﬀer in intensity, their dynamic eﬀects
are the same, up to a scale factor, ψi. While arguable, this assumption is consis-
tent with the maintained assumptions in Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Burnside,
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999).
It is also consistent with the assumptions in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992)
who identify an exogenous shock to government purchases with the innovation
1In practice we found that our results were robust to not allowing for a break in trend, i.e.
to setting A2 =0 .
5to defense purchases estimated from a linear time invariant vector autoregressive
representation of the data.
Our speciﬁcation of Zt includes the log of time t per-capita real GDP,t h el o g
of per-capita real government consumption, average capital and labor income tax
rates, the real interest rate and the nominal government surplus to GDP ratio.
Our measure of the government surplus is the consolidated federal, state and
local budget surplus’ of revenues over expenditure, inclusive of interest payments.
Below, we also consider the primary surplus to GDP ratio.2 The real interest is
the interest rate associated with Moody’s Baa corporate bonds that have average
maturity of roughly 20 years minus the consumer price index inﬂation rate over
the previous year. We assume that Zt depends on six lagged values of itself, i.e.
A3(L) is a sixth order polynomial in L. This lag length was chosen using the
modiﬁed likelihood ratio test described in Sims (1980). All estimates are based on
quarterly data from 1947:1 to 2001:2. Note that we purposefully do not include
the data containing 9/11 and its aftermath in this stage of our empirical work.
The Appendix describes the data used in our analysis.
2.2. Empirical Results
In this subsection we present the results of implementing the procedure discussed
above.
2.2.1. The Data
Figure 1 displays the data used in our analysis. Column 1 displays the log of
real military spending, real government consumption and our measure of the real
interest rate. In all cases we include vertical lines at the dates of Ramey-Shapiro
episodes and 2001:3 which encompasses 9/11. Notice that the time series on real
2The response of both surplus to GDP ratio measures to a Ramey - Shapiro epsiode is very
similar.
6defense expenditures is dominated by three events: the large increases in real
defense expenditures associated with the Korean war, the Vietnam war, and the
Carter-Reagan defense buildup. The Ramey-Shapiro dates essentially mark the
beginning of these episodes. There also appears to be a signiﬁcant buildup in
real defense expenditures around the period of 9/11. In our economic model, it
is total government consumption, rather than military purchases that is relevant.
As Figure 1 reveals, the Ramey-Shapiro and 9/11 episodes also coincide with rises
in real government consumption. For completeness, Figure 2 displays the data on
the ratio of government consumption to GDP. Notice that ratio rises signiﬁcantly
in the four episodes of concern.
T u r n i n gt ot h er e a li n t e r e s tr a t e ,t w oi n teresting features are worth noting.
First the real interest rate is consistently higher in the post-1980 period than in
the pre-1980 period. Second, there is not a consistent pattern of a rise in the
real interest rate in the immediate aftermath of the four episodes of exogenous
increases in military spending.
C o l u m n2d i s p l a y so u rm e a s u r e so fl a b o ra n dc a p i t a lt a xr a t e sa sw e l la st h e
ratio of nominal primary (dashed line) and total (solid line) government ﬁscal
surpluses to nominal GDP. Tax rates were constructed using quarterly data from
the national income and products accounts and the method employed by Jones
(2002).3 Note that labor tax rates rise substantially after all three Ramey-Shapiro
dates while capital tax rates rise after the ﬁrst two episodes. In contrast to the
Ramey - Shapiro episodes, tax rates fall sharply around the 9/11 episode.
Turning to the surplus to GDP ratio, two features are worth noting. Unlike
the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, there is a sharp decline in this ratio in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11. In addition, the real interest rate and the surplus-GDP ratio
3See Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) for a discussion of how these tax rates were
computed and how they relate to other measures used in the literature.
7are negatively correlated, with a correlation coeﬃcient of −0.53. While certainly of
interest, this last correlation does not bear directly on the Ricardian Equivalence
hypothesis which, among other things, pertains to the response of real interest
interest to a rise in the surplus, holding government consumption constant.
2.2.2. The Dynamic Response of the Economy to A Fiscal Shock
Recall that we normalize the ﬁrst episode (Korea) to be of unit intensity and we
set the intensities of the second and third episodes to 0.30 and 0.10, respectively.
Below we report the dynamic response function of various aggregates to an episode
of unit intensity. This simply scales the size of the impulse response functions. In
interpreting these results it is important to recall that we do not include the 9/11
episode in estimating the response of the economy to a ﬁscal shock.
Elsewhere we have documented the response of private sector aggregates to
the onset of a Ramey - Shapiro episode.4 Here we focus on aggregate output as
a simple summary measure of overall economic activity. In addition we examine
the behavior of the real interest rate since this plays a potentially important role
in determining the size of the overall government surplus.
The ﬁrst row of Figure 3 reports the dynamic responses of real government
consumption and output to a ﬁscal shock.5 The solid lines display point estimates
while the dashed lines correspond to 95% conﬁdence interval bands.6 As can be
4See Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) and Burnside,
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003).
5The impulse response functions for output and government consumption are reported as
percentage deviations from a variable’s unshocked path. The response functions of labor and
capital tax rates, the real interest rate and the Surplus-GDP ratio are reported as deviations
from their unshocked levels, measured in percentage points.
6These were computed using the bootstrap Monte Carlo procedure described in Edelberg,
Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999). The Monte Carlo methods that we used to quantify the im-
portance of sampling uncertainty do not convey any information about ‘date’ uncertainty. This
i sb e c a u s et h e yt a k ea sg i v e nt h eR a m e ya n dS h a p i r od a t e s . O n es i m p l ew a yt oa s s e s st h e
importance of date uncertainty is to redo the analysis perturbing the Ramey and Shapiro dates.
8seen, the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode leads to large, persistent, hump-shaped
rises in government consumption and output. Table 1 summarizes the ‘multiplier’
eﬀect on output of a ﬁscal shock. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the cumulative change
in output divided by the cumulative change in government consumption at various
horizons. This multiplier is highest at the end of year one and declines thereafter.
In sharp contrast to simple textbook Keynesian models, the multiplier is much
less than one.
Table 1. The Fiscal Multiplier
First Year Second Year Third Year Fourth Year
0.61 0.28 0.21 0.19
R o w s2a n d3i nt h eﬁrst column of Figure 3 display the dynamic response of
capital and labor tax rates to a ﬁscal policy shock. Four results are worth noting.
First, the labor tax rate rises in a hump-shaped pattern, mirroring the dynamic
response of government purchases, with the peak occurring about two years after
the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode. Second, the maximal rise in the labor tax
rate is 2.71 percentage points after nine quarters. This represents a 25 percent
increase in the tax rate relative to its value in 1949. Third, the capital tax rate
also rises in a hump-shaped manner, but the maximal rise occurs before the peak
rises in government purchases and labor tax rates. Fourth, the rise in the capital
tax rates is large, with the maximal rise of 6.83 percentage points occurring after
three quarters.
The second and third rows of the second column of Figure 3 report the re-
sponses of the real interest rate and the surplus to GDP ratio. Notice that the
real interest rate falls while the surplus to GDP rises in the immediate aftermath
Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) document the robustness of inferences under the as-
sumption that the diﬀerent episodes are of equal intensity.
9of Ramey Shapiro episode. After 3 quarters, the real interest rate begins to rise
and the surplus to GDP ratio begins to fall. The behavior of the surplus to
GDP ratio reﬂects that (i) capital tax rates peak prior to the peak in government
consumption and then begin to decline, and (ii) labor tax rates rise along with
government consumption. This pattern of tax rates leads to the result that the
surplus ﬁrst rises and then, only with a lag, begins to decline.
We now present an alternative way to assess the historical impact of the Ramey
Shapiro ﬁscal episodes on the economy. Speciﬁcally, we used the estimated version
of (2.1) to generate forecasts of Zt conditional on the occurrence of a ﬁscal shock,
given the state of the economy at the time that the shock occurs. The forecasts for
the impact of the Korean, Vietnam and Carter-Reagan episodes correspond to the
long dashed lines in Figures 4, 5 and 6. These correspond to what the estimated
model says Zt w o u l dh a v eb e e ng i v e nt h eﬁscal shocks in question, absent any
additional shocks. The short dashed lines in these ﬁgures are the forecasts values
of Zt assuming that no shock, ﬁscal or otherwise, occurred, given the state of the
economy at the time of relevant Ramey- Shapiro episode or afterwards. The solid
lines correspond to the actual values of Zt.
According to Figure 4, given the state of the economy, the ﬁscal shock associ-
ated with the Korean episode accounts for much of the actual movement in tax
rates, the real interest rate and the surplus to GDP ratio for the ﬁrst few years
after 1950:3. From the perspective of our statistical model, this is equivalent to
saying that other shocks played only a minor role during this time period. This
is less so for the period after the Vietnam War (Figure 5) and much less so for
the period after the invasion of Afghanistan (Figure 6). For example, the ﬁscal
shock does little to explain the sharp rise and subsequent fall in the labor tax
during the period 1980 to 1983. It also does not explain the initial rise and sub-
sequent steep declines in capital tax rates during the Carter - Reagan episode.
10This is not a statement that the model is incorrectly speciﬁed. It simply says that
other important shocks occurred in the aftermath of the last two Ramey - Shapiro
episodes.
2.2.3. How Unusual is Post-9/11 Fiscal Policy?
In this subsection we address the question: Is ﬁscal policy in the aftermath of
9/11 well explained as the normal response of the economy to large exogenous
shocks to government military expenditures? To be clear, by ‘normal’ we mean
our estimates of the response of ﬁscal policy to the onset of a Ramey - Shapiro
episode. To address this question we proceed as follows. First, we assume that, in
terms of the rise in government consumption, the 9/11 episode is 10% as intense
(in the sense deﬁned above), as the Korean episode. Second, we use the estimated
version of (2.1) to generate forecasts of Zt conditional on the occurrence of a ﬁscal
shock in 2001:3, given the state of the economy as of 2001:2. This forecast assumes
that ﬁscal policy responds to 9/11 in the same way that it did in the other three
Ramey - Shapiro episodes. Figure 7 reports the forecasts generated under this
assumption (the long dashed line). As before the solid line displays the realized
values of Zt. The short dashed line denotes the forecasts of Zt given the state of
the economy as of 2001:2, but assuming there was not a ﬁscal shock in 2001:3.
As can be seen, the general rise in government consumption is well explained
by the 9/11 shock. So is the rise in output although there is clear evidence of
another shock which drove output down in 2002. Other things equal, the decline
in output would reduce tax revenues and the government surplus. The behavior of
t h eo t h e rv a r i a b l e si nZt is substantially less well explained by the 9/11 shock. For
example, the declines in average capital and labor tax rates are much larger than
our conditional forecast. Perhaps even more striking is the diﬀerence between
the actual and predicted values of the surplus to GDP ratio. The statistical
11model predicts that, had the government responded to 9/11 as it did to the other
Ramey Shapiro shocks, then absent other shocks, the surplus would initially have
risen and then slowly declined to the point where the consolidated budget was
essentially balanced. In fact, the surplus suﬀered a sharp, ongoing decline. This
reﬂects that (i) tax rates fell much more sharply than anticipated and (ii) output
grew less quickly
3. The Impact of Alternative Tax Policies
In this section we consider the question: How would have aggregate output and
the surplus responded to the post-9/11 rise in government consumption had the
government pursued alternative tax policies? We cannot answer this question us-
ing purely statistical models of the sort discussed above because the experiments
we wish to contemplate amount to a change in policy. Standard Lucas critique
r e a s o n i n gs a y sw ec a no n l yc o n d u c tt h i st y p eo fe x p e r i m e n ti na ne c o n o m i cm o d e l .
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) argue that a particular neoclassical busi-
ness cycle model does a good job of accounting for the quantitative impact of a
Ramey-Shapiro episode on aggregate hours worked, after tax real wages, consump-
tion and investment. So that model provides a useful ‘laboratory’ within which to
examine the impact of alternative ﬁscal policies. In this section we describe this
model and use it to address our question.
3.1. A Simple Neoclassical Model
In this subsection we discussion the neoclassical model in Burnside, Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2004) that allows for habit formation and adjustment costs in invest-
ment. The latter two perturbations do not aﬀect the qualitative properties of the
model but they improve the model’s ability to account for the quantitative aﬀects
of a ﬁscal shock.
12A representative household ranks alternative streams of consumption and











t = Ct − bCt−1,b ≥ 0 (3.2)
V (1 − nt)=
½ 1
1−µ(1 − nt)1−µ,µ ≥ 0
ln(1 − nt),µ =1
. (3.3)
Here E0 is the time 0 conditional expectations operator, β is a subjective discount
factor between 0 and 1,w h i l eCt and nt denote time t consumption and the fraction
of the household’s time endowment devoted to work, respectively. When b>0,
(3.1) allows for habit formation in consumption. Given (3.3), the representative
household’s Frisch elasticity of labor supply, evaluated at the steady state level of
hours, n,i se q u a lt o(1 − n)/(nµ).
The household owns the stock of capital, whose value at the beginning of time t
we denote by Kt. As in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) and Christiano
and Fisher (2003) capital evolves according to according to
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + F(It,I t−1) (3.4)
where






The functional form for F in (3.5) penalizes changes in It. Many authors in the
literature adopt speciﬁcations which penalize the level of investment. Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) argue that it is diﬃcult to generate hump shaped
responses of investment to shocks with the latter speciﬁcation. In contrast, hump
13shaped responses of investment emerge naturally with speciﬁcation (3.5). Chris-
tiano and Fisher (2003) argue that these adjustment costs are useful for under-
standing the dynamics of stock market and investment good prices.
We restrict the function, S, to satisfy the following properties: S(1) = S0(1) =
0, and s ≡ S00(1) > 0. Under our assumptions, in a nonstochastic steady state
F1 =1 ,F 2 =0 . The steady state values of the variables are not a function of the
adjustment cost parameter, s. Of course, the dynamics of the model are inﬂuenced
by s. When s =0the model is equivalent to one without adjustment costs. Given
our solution procedure no other features of the S function need to be speciﬁed.
The household rents out capital and supplies labor in perfectly competitive
spot factor markets. We denote the real wage rate per unit of labor by wt and
the real rental rate on capital by rt. The government taxes rental income net of
depreciation, and wage income at the rates τkt and τnt, respectively. Consequently,
after-tax real wage and rental rate on capital are given by (1 − τnt)Wt and (1 −
τkt)rt + δτkt, respectively. Therefore, the household’s time t b u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti s
given by
Ct + It ≤ (1 − τnt)Wtnt +( 1− τkt)rtKt + δτktKt − Φt (3.6)
where Φt denotes lump sum taxes paid by the household.




1−α, 0 < α < 1. (3.7)
The ﬁr ms e l l si t so u t p u ti nap e r f e c t l yc o m p e t i t i v eg o o d sm a r k e ta n dr e n t sl a b o r
and capital in perfectly competitive spot markets.
The government purchases Gt units of output at time t. For simplicity we
assume the government balances its budget every period. Government purchases
are ﬁnanced by capital taxes, labor taxes and lump sum taxes, Φt. Consequently
14the government’s budget constraint is given by
Gt = τntWtnt + τkt(rt − δ)Kt + Φt.
Given our assumptions, Ricardian equivalence holds with respect to the timing of
lump sum taxes.7 S ow ec o u l da l l o wt h eg o v e r n m e n tt ob o r r o wp a r to ra l lo ft h e
diﬀerence between its expenditures and revenues raised from distortionary taxes,
subject to its intertemporal budget constraint, and it would not aﬀect our results.
The vector ft =[ l o g ( Gt),τkt,τnt]
0 evolves according to
ft = f + hf(L)εt. (3.8)
Here εt is a zero mean, iid scalar random variable that is orthogonal to all model
variables dated time t − 1 and earlier. In addition hf(L)=[ h1(L),h 2(L),h 3(L)]0
where hi(L),i=1 ,2,3 is a qth ordered polynomial in nonnegative powers of the lag
operator L,a n df denotes the steady state value of ft. Note that εt is common to
both government spending and taxes. This formalizes the notion that government
spending and taxes respond simultaneously to a common ﬁscal shock.
The problem of the representative household is to maximize (3.1) subject to
(3.6), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.2), (3.8) and a given stochastic process for wage and
rental rates. The maximization is by choice of contingency plans for {Ct,K t+1,nt}
over the elements of the household’s time t information set that includes all model
variables dated time t and earlier.
The ﬁrm’s problem is to maximize time t proﬁts. Its ﬁrst order conditions
imply
Wt =( 1− α)(Kt/nt)
α and rt = α(nt/Kt)
1−α .
We use the log-linearization procedure described by Christiano (1998) to solve
for the competitive equilibrium of this economy. To conserve on notation we ab-
7This assumes the absence of distortionary taxes on government debt.
15stracted from growth when presenting our model. However we do allow for growth
when calibrating the model. Speciﬁcally we assume that total factor productivity




This model of growth is inconsistent with the way we treated growth in section
2 where we assume a trend break in 1973:2. To understand the nature of the
approximation involved, note that Christiano’s solution procedure involves taking
a log linear approximation about the model’s steady state. Suppose that the break
in trend is unanticipated and the model has converged to its stochastic steady
state by the time of the third Ramey Shapiro episode. One way to implement
Christiano’s procedure is to compute two log linear equilibrium laws of motion
for the model corresponding to the pre- and post-1973:2 periods. The diﬀerence
between the two is that the log linear approximation is computed about two
diﬀerent steady states of the model corresponding to the pre- and post-1973:2
growth rate of technology. We approximate this procedure by computing one law
of motion around the steady state of the model assuming a growth rate of output,
γ =1 .005. This is equal to the average growth rate of output over the whole
sample period.
3.2. Calibration
In this subsection we brieﬂy describe how we calibrated the model’s parameter
values. We assume that a time period in the model corresponds to one quarter
and set β =1 .03−1/4. The parameter η was set to imply that in nonstochas-
tic steady state the representative consumer spends 24% o fh i st i m ee n d o w m e n t
working (see, for example, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). To evaluate the
dependence of the model’s implications on the Frisch labor supply elasticity we
consider three values for µ.T h eﬁrst, µ =0 , corresponds to the Hansen-Rogerson
inﬁnite elasticity case. The second, µ =1 , implies the utility function for leisure is
16logarithmic. Combined with our assumption that the representative agent spends
24 percent of his time endowment working, this value corresponds to a Frisch
labor supply elasticity of 3.16.F i n a l l y , w e c o n s i d e r µ =1 0 , which corresponds
to a Frisch labor supply elasticity of 0.33, which is similar to the low elasticities
often obtained using microeconomic data. The rate of depreciation on capital δ
was set to 0.021 while α was set to 0.34 (see Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992).
We also set b =0 .8 and s =2 .0. This value of b is close to values used in the
literature (see for example Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001). The value of
s is close to the value estimated by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001).
They show that 1/s is the elasticity of investment with respect to a one percent
temporary increase in the price of installed capital. So a value of s equal to two
implies this this elasticity is equal to 0.5. We chose this value because it leads to
a better performance of the model (see Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher 2004).
3.3. Accounting for a Ramey-Shapiro Episode
As mentioned above, Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) analyze the ability
of the model to account for the response of hours worked, the after tax real
wage rate, consumption and investment to a Ramey-Shapiro episode. They argue
that the model does well from both a qualitative and a quantitative perspective in
accounting for the dynamics of these variables. Here we brieﬂy discuss the model’s
performance with respect to output, the real interest rate and the primary surplus
to GDP ratio to the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode. For this exercise we specify
hi(L),i =1 ,2,3 to correspond to the estimated response of total government
consumption, the capital income tax rate and the labor income tax rate at t + j
to the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode at time t.8
Figure 8 displays the dynamic response of output, the real interest rate and the
8In practice we use 50 coeﬃcients in h1(L) and 16 coeﬃcients in h2(L) and h3(L).
17surplus to GDP ratio, to a ﬁscal shock of unit intensity, i.e. a shock correpsonding
to the intensity of the Korean epsiode. Columns 1, 2 and 3 three report results
for µ = {0,1,10}, i.e. high, medium and low Frisch labor supply elasticities. In
all cases, the long dashed lines correspond to the model based impulse response
functions. The solid lines are our empirical estimates of the impulse response
functions of output, the real interest rate and the primary surplus. The lines
with the small dashes are 95% conﬁdence intervals around the empirical point
estimates.
Notice that for all values of µ, the model generates a prolonged rise in output in
response to a positive ﬁscal policy shock that is within the 95% conﬁdence intervals
of our point estimates. The rise in output reﬂects the fact that an increase in Gt
raises the present value of the household’s taxes and lowers its permanent income.
Since leisure is a normal good, equilibrium hours worked rises. Notice that the
rise in output is largest when labor supply is the most elastic. The basic intuition
for this result is as follows. The larger is µ the more the household wishes to
smooth hours worked. Since hours worked do not change in steady state, as µ
becomes larger, the household ﬁnds it optimal to respond to a rise in the present
value of its taxes by reducing private consumption by relatively more and varying
hours worked less.
Not surprisingly, the model does much less well with respect to the real interest
rate. In the model agents’ have a strong desire to smooth consumption service
ﬂows. This in turn implies that the real rate moves very little. So this model, like
most neoclassical models, does poorly at matching movements in asset prices.
Now we consider the response of the surplus to GDP ratio. Our model based
measure is the diﬀerence between government revenues from distortionary taxes
minus government purchases. It is important to emphasize that our model allows
for lump sum taxation, something clearly at variance with institutional reality. So
18we have much more conﬁdence in the model’s qualitative predictions rather than
its quantitative predictions for the surplus. That being said, Figure 7 indicates
that all versions of the model succeed in reproducing the qualitative response of
the surplus to GDP ratio, generating an initial rise followed by a fall. Since the
initial rise in output is most pronounced when µ =0 , this version of the model
does the best job of accounting for the initial rise in the surplus. All versions of
the model do a reasonable job of accounting for the quantitative fall in the surplus
to GDP ratio.
3.4. Alternative Tax Policies
Here we consider the model’s implications for three alternative tax responses to
9/11 which correspond to three speciﬁcations for the jth coeﬃcient in the expan-
sion of hi(L),i=1 ,2,3.I nt h eﬁrst, which we refer to as the normal speciﬁcation,
these coeﬃcients are given by 0.10 times the estimated response of real govern-
ment purchases, the capital income tax rate and the labor income tax rate at
t+j to the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode at time t. This corresponds to our
assumption that the 9/11 shock is 0.10 as ‘intense’ (from an economic point of
view) as the Korean episode.9 In the second case, which we refer to as the no tax
change speciﬁcation, we retain the speciﬁcation of h1(L) from the normal speciﬁ-
cation, but set the coeﬃcients in h2(L) and h3(L) equal to zero. This means that
tax rates do not respond to the ﬁscal shock and remain ﬁxed at their pre-9/11
level. Finally, in the third case, which we refer to as the lower tax speciﬁcation,w e
retain the speciﬁcation of h1(L) from the normal speciﬁcation, but reduce average
labor and capital taxes taxes by four percentage points in a very persistent way.10
This roughly corresponds to the actual decline in average taxes between 2001:2
9In practice we use 50 coeﬃcients in h1(L),h 2(L) and h3(L).
10Speciﬁc a l l y ,w ea s s u m et h a tt a xr a t e sr i s ea f t e rt h ei n i t i a ls h o c kb y0.001 percent each year.
19and 2003:3 shown in Figures 1 and 6.
Columns 1, 2 and 3 of Figure 9 report our results for the three speciﬁcations.11
Throughout the solid line, the dashed line and the dotted line correspond to the
response of the model in the high, medium and low elasticity labor supply case,
respectively. Not surprisingly, the response of output to the increase in government
consumption is inversely related to the response of taxes. For example, the peak
rise in output in the normal speciﬁcation when µ =1 , is roughly 0.29, whereas
it is 0.42 in the no tax change speciﬁcation. Indeed a close to permanent drop
in taxes generates an enormous rise in output. Even in the low labor supply
speciﬁcation, µ =1 0 , the ﬁscal shock generates a highly persistent rise in output
that approaches of 1.6% after 4 years.
The normal speciﬁcation implies that a ﬁscal shock is associated with a small
rise in the surplus to GDP ratio followed by a persistent but small decline. The
surplus to GDP ratio responds in a similar way under the no tax change speciﬁ-
cation. Finally, consistent with the actual post-9/11 data, the lower tax change
speciﬁcation implies that the surplus to GDP ratio declines immediately and stays
well below its pre-shock level for an extended period of time. To the extent that
the tax cuts are viewed as highly persistent, this result provides a formal inter-
pretation of the view that the large drop in the surplus to GDP ratio following
9/11 is due to an atypical reduction in tax rates after a large increase in military
spending.
Of course, it is diﬃcult to know whether the tax cuts will turn out to be
permanent or whether agents perceived them as such. To assess the robustness of
our results, we considered the model’s implications for a temporary tax cut. This
speciﬁcation is identical to the lower tax speciﬁcation except we assume that tax
11Because the intensity of the shock is 0.10, the impulse response functions correspoding to
the normal speciﬁcation in Figure 9 are one-tenth the size of the corresponding impulse response
functions in Figure 8
20rates return to their pre-shock levels after three years. Interestingly, in results
not displayed, we ﬁnd that the responses of output and the surplus to GDP ratio
in the two tax cut cases are very similar over the ﬁrst three years. Thereafter,
the responses diﬀer substantially. In the temporary tax cut case, after year three,
output starts declining to its pre-shock level. In contrast, in the permanent tax
cut case, output remains persistently high (see Figure 9). In the temporary tax
cut case, after year three, the surplus to GDP very quickly reverts to its pre-
shock value. But, in the permanent tax cut case, that ratio remains very low for
an extended period of time (again, see Figure 9). We infer that, at least in our
model, the basic eﬀects of a cut in tax rates do not depend sensitively on how
permanent the cuts are. A cut in tax rates lead to a rise in output and a fall in
the surplus to GDP ratio, for as long as the tax cuts are in eﬀect.
We conclude by considering the relative contributions of the rise in government
purchases and the cut in tax rates to the fall in the surplus to GDP ratio that
occurs in the lower tax speciﬁcation. Taking as given the rise in government
purchases and output that occurs in that speciﬁcation, we calculated the dynamic
response of the surplus to GDP ratio assuming that tax rates stayed at their pre-
shock steady state levels. Figure 10 displays our results in the high, medium and
low elasticity labor supply cases, corresponding to the solid, dashed and dotted
lines, respectively. Note that in the ﬁrst two cases, the surplus to GDP ratio
actually rises after the increase in government purchases. This reﬂects the large
rise in output, and tax revenues, when labor supply is relatively elastic. In the
low labor supply elasticity case, the rise in government consumption leads, after
a brief delay, to a decline in the surplus to GDP ratio. But this decline is very
small (roughly 0.5 percentage points) compared to the decline of 3.5% percentage
points that occurs under the lower tax speciﬁcation. This adds further support
to our claim that the primary factor driving the post-9/11 decline in the surplus
21to GDP ratio was the cut in tax rates.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we argued that ﬁscal policy in the aftermath of 9/11 is not well
explained as the normal response of the U.S. economy to a large exogenous increase
in government consumption. It is diﬃcult to explain the dramatic fall in the
government surplus and the large fall in labor and capital tax rates as reﬂecting
either the state of the U.S. economy as of 9/11 or as the typical response of ﬁscal
policy to a large exogenous rise in military expenditures.
We also addressed the question of how aggregate output and the surplus to
GDP ratio would have responded to the post-9/11 rise in government consumption
had the government pursued alternative tax policies. Using the model developed
in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), we argued that, had government tax
policy responded to 9/11 in the same the way that it responded to other large
exogenous increases in military spending, 9/11 would have been associated with
a small change in aggregate output and the surplus to GDP ratio. Our model
also implies that, given the same path of government spending, a cut in tax rates
similar to those actually observed in the aftermath of 9/11, would have resulted in
a sharp, persistent decline in the government surplus to GDP ratio and a relatively
l a r g er i s ei na g g r e g a t eo u t p u t .T h i sp r o v i d e sa d d i t i o n a le v i d e n c ei nf a v o ro ft h e
view that the recent sharp drop in the surplus to GDP ratio reﬂects ongoing tax
policy developments that are atypical relative to post-WWII U.S. experience after
a large increase in military spending.
We conclude by emphasizing that our results do not bear on the question of
whether the decline in tax rates and the decline in the surplus after 9/11 were
desirable or not.
22Data Appendix
All data series are seasonally adjusted except for the population and the real in-
terest rate. Output is GDP (Haver mnemonic GDPH). Defense spending includes
both consumption and investment spending (GFDH). Government consumption is
defense spending plus Federal, State and Local consumption expenditures (chain
weighted sum of GFDH, GFNEH and GSEH). All real series are in units of 1996
chain-weighted dollars. The surplus is the ratio of the consolidated Federal, State
and Local surplus as measured in the National Income and Product Accounts
(GBAL). The real interest rate is the diﬀerence between the Moody’s BAA com-
posite bond rate (FBAA) and consumer price index inﬂation over the prior four
quarters (CPIU). Our measure of the poplulation is the civilian working age pop-
ulation (LN16N).
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